Organic Codes: A Unifying Concept for Life.

Although the knowledge about biological systems has advanced exponentially in recent decades, it is surprising to realize that the very definition of Life keeps presenting theoretical challenges. Even if several lines of reasoning seek to identify the essence of life phenomenon, most of these thoughts contain fundamental problem in their basic conceptual structure. Most concepts fail to identify either necessary or sufficient features to define life. Here, we analyzed the main conceptual frameworks regarding theoretical aspects that have been supporting the most accepted concepts of life, such as (i) the physical, (ii) the cellular and (iii) the molecular approaches. Based on an ontological analysis, we propose that Life should not be positioned under the ontological category of Matter. Yet, life should be better understood under the top-level ontology of "Process". Exercising an epistemological approach, we propose that the essential characteristic that pervades each and every living being is the presence of organic codes. Therefore, we explore theories in biosemiotics and code biology in order to propose a clear concept of life as a macrocode composed by multiple inter-related coding layers. This way, as life is a sort of metaphysical process of encoding, the living beings became the molecular materialization of that process. From the proposed concept, we show that the evolutionary process is a fundamental characteristic for life's maintenance but it is not necessary to define life, as many organisms are clearly alive but they do not participate in the evolutionary process (such as infertile hybrids). The current proposition opens a fertile field of debate in astrobiology, epistemology, biosemiotics, code biology and robotics.

La discontinuidad entre lo humano y lo animal en la Historia natural de Buffon / The discontinuity between humans and animals in Buffon's Natural history

Resumen Según Buffon, la diferencia entre las capacidades cognitivas del hombre y las de los demás animales no podía ser explicada por causas naturales. La constatación de esas diferencias obligaba a aceptar que el Creador había dotado al hombre de un alma inmaterial que no tenía parangón en los animales. Aquí se pretende mostrar que esa claudicación del naturalismo buffoniano no responde a un presupuesto teológico, sino a la imposibilidad de compatibilizar esa supuesta heterogeneidad existente entre las facultades cognitivas animales y humanas con la explicación materialista del origen de las especies que Buffon fue delineando a lo largo de sus escritos. Si se piensa al hombre como algo excepcional, su origen también tendrá que ser entendido como algo milagroso.

Abstract According to Buffon, the difference between man’s cognitive abilities and those of other animals could not be attributed to natural causes. Noting these differences necessarily meant accepting that the Creator had endowed man with an immaterial soul that was unparalleled among animals. This article seeks to show that Buffon’s abandonment of naturalism was not the result of a theological premise but of the impossibility of reconciling the presumed heterogeneity between animal and human cognitive faculties with the materialist explanation of the origin of species that Buffon outlined in the course of his writings. If man is assumed to be an exceptional being, the origin of the human race must also be seen as miraculous.

The discontinuity between humans and animals in Buffon's Natural history. / La discontinuidad entre lo humano y lo animal en la Historia natural de Buffon.

According to Buffon, the difference between man's cognitive abilities and those of other animals could not be attributed to natural causes. Noting these differences necessarily meant accepting that the Creator had endowed man with an immaterial soul that was unparalleled among animals. This article seeks to show that Buffon's abandonment of naturalism was not the result of a theological premise but of the impossibility of reconciling the presumed heterogeneity between animal and human cognitive faculties with the materialist explanation of the origin of species that Buffon outlined in the course of his writings. If man is assumed to be an exceptional being, the origin of the human race must also be seen as miraculous.

Taxa as types: Buffon, Cuvier and Lamarck. / Los taxones como tipos: Buffon, Cuvier y Lamarck.

From a Darwinian point of view, taxonomic groups are understood as historical entities that arise at an evolutionary moment and that can always disappear. But these groups were also understood by many naturalists as natural kinds; in other words, as permanent, ahistorical types. I will explore some of the forms that this typological thought took, showing that this typological perspective neither depends on theological beliefs, nor obeys the adoption of an ontology that might contradict natural science. Thus I shall analyze Buffon's understanding of species and the ways in which Cuvier and Lamarck understood the higher taxonomic orders.

Los taxones como tipos: Buffon, Cuvier y Lamarck / Taxa as types: Buffon, Cuvier and Lamarck

Darwinianamente, los grupos taxonómicos son entendidos como entidades históricas que surgen en un momento de la evolución y que siempre pueden desaparecer. Pero esos grupos también fueron entendidos por muchos naturalistas como clases naturales; es decir, como tipos permanentes, a-históricos. Es mi interés señalar algunas de las formas que ese pensamiento tipológico de hecho ha tomado, subrayando que la adopción de esa perspectiva tipológica, además de no responder a compromisos teológicos, tampoco tiene porqué obedecer a la adopción de una ontología que pueda estar en conflicto con la ciencia natural. Analizaré así el modo en el que Buffon entendió las especies y el modo en los que Cuvier y Lamarck entendieron los órdenes taxonómicos superiores.

From a Darwinian point of view, taxonomic groups are understood as historical entities that arise at an evolutionary moment and that can always disappear. But these groups were also understood by many naturalists as natural kinds; in other words, as permanent, ahistorical types. I will explore some of the forms that this typological thought took, showing that this typological perspective neither depends on theological beliefs, nor obeys the adoption of an ontology that might contradict natural science. Thus I shall analyze Buffon's understanding of species and the ways in which Cuvier and Lamarck understood the higher taxonomic orders.

La evo-devo com ciencia histórica de causas remotas / Evo-devo as Historical Science of Ultimates Causes

Partiendo de la premisa de que una causa próxima es aquella cuyos efectos pueden ser registrados en los estados de un organismo individual. En este trabajo sostendré que lo que define a una causa remota es el hecho de que sus efectos puedan ser registrados en la evolución de linajes, y no simplemente en estados poblacionales. Esto, por otra parte, no solo nos permitirá entender en qué sentido los constreñimientos ontogenéticos deben ser comprendidos como causas remotas de los fenómenos evolutivos; sino que además nos permitirá poner en evidencia el carácter eminentemente histórico de la Biología evolucionaria del desarrollo que Wallace Arthur subestimó en Biased Embryos and Evolution. Así, y siguiendo esta última línea de razonamiento, también intentaré mostrar que, aunque la acción de dichos constreñimientos ontogenéticos pueda verificarse más allá de los límites de una población o especie particular, eso no implica que estemos asistiendo a un retorno del pensamiento tipológico en Biología evolucionaria.

Having as starting point that a proximal cause is one whose effects can be registered in the states of an individual organism, in this work I will argue that what defines an ultimate cause is the fact that its effects can be registered in the evolution of lineages, and not simply in population states. This, on the other hand, not only will allow us to clarify how the developmental constraints can be understood as causes of the evolutionary phenomena; but also it will allow us to point the eminently historical character of Developmental Evolutionary Biology that Wallace Arthur undermined in Biased Embryos and Evolution. Thus, and following this latter reasoning, I will also try to show that, although the action of developmental constraints could happen beyond the limits of a population or a particular species, does not imply that we are facing the return of typological thought in Evolutionary Biology.

La miseria de la degeneración: el materialismo de Buffon y las 'limitaciones' de su transformismo / The misery of degeneration: Buffon's materialism and the 'limitations' of his transformism

En "De la degeneración des animales", de 1766, Buffon sostuvo un 'transformismo limitado' que, doce años después, en Las épocas de la naturaleza, sería complementado por una teoría materialista sobre el origen de la vida que ponía en evidencia que, para el cientista, esa alternativa estaba vedada: las condiciones bajo las cuales los seres vivos desarrollan sus existencias podrían explicar cómo las diferentes especies que componen los distintos géneros de animales se habrían formado a partir de la degeneración de una especie originaria. Pero, la constitución de esas múltiples cepas primigenias sólo podría explicarse por un súbito proceso de generación espontánea. Una limitación inherente al propio sistema de ideas que lo había llevado hasta ese transformismo limitado: la propia teoría de la generación y la reproducción que le servía de base inhibía la posibilidad de su radicalización.

In "Of the degeneration of animals" (1766), Buffon espoused a kind of limited transformism. Yet twelve years later, in Epochs of Nature, he supplemented this with a materialist theory on the origin of life that left no room for this alternative: the conditions under which living beings develop could explain how the different species within each animal genus had formed through the degeneration of an originating species. But the formation of these multiple, originating varieties could only be explained by a sudden process of spontaneous generation. A limitation inherent to the very system of ideas that had taken Buffon to limited transformism - the underlying theory of generation and reproduction - preempted the possibility of its radicalization.

[The misery of degeneration: Buffon's materialism and the 'limitations' of his transformism]. / La miseria de la degeneración: el materialismo de Buffon y las 'limitaciones' de su transformismo.

In "Of the degeneration of animals" (1766), Buffon espoused a kind of limited transformism. Yet twelve years later, in Epochs of Nature, he supplemented this with a materialist theory on the origin of life that left no room for this alternative: the conditions under which living beings develop could explain how the different species within each animal genus had formed through the degeneration of an originating species. But the formation of these multiple, originating varieties could only be explained by a sudden process of spontaneous generation. A limitation inherent to the very system of ideas that had taken Buffon to limited transformism the underlying theory of generation and reproduction -preempted the possibility of its radicalization.

Física del organismo vs hermenéutica del viviente: el alcance del programa reduccionista en la biología contemporánea / Physics of organisms versus hermeneutics of living being: the reach of the reductionist program in contemporary biology

La distinción entre biología funcional y biología evolutiva, conforme la plantearon E. Mayr y F. Jacob, es clave para un tratamiento conclusivo de uno de los más discutidos problemas de la filosofía de la biología: la posible reducción de la biología a física y química. Las preguntas que definen los objetivos cognitivos de la biología funcional son diferentes de aquellas que guían la física: son preguntas funcionales; pero las respuestas que buscamos para ellas pueden escribirse en el lenguaje de la física. Mientras tanto, las cuestiones planteadas en la biología evolutiva nos conducen hacia un tipo de discurso intraducible en el lenguaje de la física. Para mostrar esto analizamos los procedimientos experimentales que han sido desarrollados en genética de poblaciones.

The distinction between functional biology and evolutionary biology, as set out by E. Mayr and F. Jacob, is central to any conclusive findings on one of the most widely discussed problems in the philosophy of biology: the possible reduction of biology to physics and chemistry. The questions that define the cognitive objectives of functional biology are different from those that guide physics: they are functional questions, but the answers we seek for them can be expressed in the language of physics. Meanwhile, the questions set forth in evolutionary biology lead to a kind of discourse that cannot be translated into the language of physics. In order to show this we analyze the experimental procedures that have been developed in population genetics.

Retorno a Limoges. La adaptación en Lamarck / No disponible

Contrariando las lecturas post-darwinianas de Lamarck, Camille Limoges nos dió algunas claves que, debidamente reconsideradas, nos permiten afirmar que, para el autor de la Filosofía Zoologica, las modificaciones de los perfiles orgánicos producidas por las circunstancias no eran nada semejante a lo que hoy caracterizamos como respuestas a las exigencias del medio. Las mismas eran simples transformaciones producidas por procesos fisiológicos que modelaban lo viviente con total independencia del carácter favorable o desfavorable que pudiesen revestir las modificaciones producidas

In this article I will be analyzing the Darwinist paradigm inthe biological science. discussing its capacity to give satisfactory understanding of the new data from biochemistry, microbiology and genetics. The general aim of this analysis is to contribute for the debate about the statute of the scientific theories. Its specific aim is to reflect upon a possible crisis of the Darwinist paradigm, which could corroborate the conception of scientific theories as something historically transitory, and not as definitive discoveries

Georges Cuvier ¿un nombre olvidado en la historia de la fisiología?

Institucionalmente, el programa de Cuvier se desarrolló en un espacio ajeno al de las ciencias medicas; pero, desde una perspectiva epistemológica sus preocupaciones teóricas coincidían con aquellas que guiaron gran parte de ese dominio de investigaciones. Su anatomía comparada era un recurso para desarrollar la fisiología; ciencia que él consideraba parte de una historia natural entendida como física particular (AU)

Claude Bernard y los límites de la fisiología experimental / Claude Bernard and the boundaries of experimental physiology

En sus " Leçons sur phénomènes de la vie communs aux animaux et aux végétaux", Claude Bernard señalaba ciertas fronteras para el programa formulado en su " Introduction a l'étude de la médecine expérimentale" que la propia existencia de la biología evolutiva y la biología del desarollo parecen cuestionar. Lo que aquí nos proponemos es discutir los posibles fundamentos de esa aparente limitación en la perspectiva bernardiana

O método socrático / The socratic method

Este estudo analisa a inovação introduzida pelos primeiros filósofos gregos na história do pensamento. Mostra que a partir da instauração do modo socrático de perguntar e responder inventou-se a tradição crítica ou racional; isto é: a tradição de discutir. Sem essa prática quase ritual chamada 'dialética', nem a filosofia, nem o que hoje chamamos 'ciência', teriam sido possíveis.

An analysis is conducted on the innovation brought about by the first Greek philosophers in the history of thought. The authors intend to demonstrate that, after the Socratic way of asking and answering had been installed, the critic or rational tradition was invented, that is, the tradition of debating without such an almost ritualistic practice, called 'science' would have become possible.

Este estudio pretende analisar la innovación introducida por los primeros filósofos griegos en la história del pensamiento. Prentendemos mostrar que a partir de la instauración del modo socrático de perguntar y responder se inventó la tradición crítica o racional, es decir: la tradición de discutir. Sin essa práctica casi ritual llamada de 'dialéctica', ni la filosofia ni lo que hoy llamamos 'ciencia' hubieran sido posibles.